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A Human Communication Approach to 
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Anton Karl Kozlovic 
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Interreligious dialogue schemes based upon different faith traditions 
exist; however, to chose one scheme over another can generate 
religious tensions, possible accusations of bias and even event-cum-
religion snubbing. One way of circumventing this potential problem 
is to adopt a generic, non-sectarian model based upon human 
communication science. The critical literature was reviewed and 
Taylor et al. 's (1977) classic transactional communication model 
(TCM) was explicated. This eight-element model comprising of (I) 
Source, (2) Stimulus, (3) Receiver, (4) Sensory Receptors, (5) 
Interpretation/Response, (6) Noise, (7) Feedback and (8) Situation/ 
Context was applied to a hypothetical bi-lateral dialogue to 
demonstrate its methodological viability. This scientific 
(re)conceptualisation of dialoguing redefined its constitutive 
elements, provided new insights into the theoretical foundations of 
the enterprise, and highlighted important praxis requirements for the 
design, organisation and running of future events. Further research 
into this exciting interdisciplinary field was recommended. 
Introduction 
Many interreligious dialogue schemes abound, whether they be strictly 
interreligious (e.g., Christianity vs. Buddhism), intrareligious (e.g., Roman 
Catholicism vs. Protestantism) or interideological (e.g., Christianity vs. 
Marxism). For example, dialogue imperatives, schemes, models, directions and 
guidelines have been based upon: The Patriarch Abraham (Washington, 1995), 
The Bible (Hesselgrave, 1978), Christianity (Ogden, 1994; Peters, 1986), Jesus 
Christ (Cox, 1989), Judaism (Fisher, 1990; Lee, 1991; Shapiro, 1989), 
Liberation Theology (Fernandes, 1995), Melchizedek (Thomas, 2000), the 
Virgin Mary (Hurley, 2000), African Religion - Yoruba (Abimbola, 1989), 
Native American Traditions (Grim, 1985), Hinduism (Rambachan, 1987), 
Islam (Ali, 1989), Jainism (Jain, 1989), Sikhism (Kapoor, 1990), 
Zoroastrianism (Dhalla, 1989), Buddhism (Corless, 1990; King, 1990), 
Chinese Philosophy (Fung, 1989), Confucianism (Tucker, 1990), Japanese 
Religious Traditions (Keane, 1990), Shintoism (Komori, 1989) and Marxism 
(Mojzes, 1978). 
These authors have variously claimed, implied or assumed that "better'' 
dialogue can be achieved by adopting their particular religious or ideologically-
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based scheme since they all believe that they possess worthwhile truth, if not the 
truth. Indeed, organisations such as the World Council of Churches Interreligious 
Relations and Dialogue team was purposely founded to promote: 
... contact between Christians and neighbours of other faiths primarily 
through multi-lateral and bi-lateral dialogue with partners of other faiths 
that is aimed at building trust, meeting common challenges and 
addressing conflictive and divisive issues ... During the past years, the 
WCC has organised a number of Hindu-Christian, Christian-Muslim, 
Buddhist-Christian, and Jewish-Christian dialogues at the international 
and regional levels (World Council of Churches, 200 I: I). 
Of course, other religions have their own dialogue organisations, event 
programs and comrnunicological impulses designed to share their faith with the 
world, but these will not be dealt with here. 
Some Dialogue Conference Assumptions 
Many styles of dialoguing and invitation tactics exist (Kozlovic, 2002), and 
the specific qualifications needed by legitimate delegates can be very demanding 
(Kozlovic, 2001a), especially with complex event configurations. However, for the 
purposes of this introductory methodological explication, it is temporarily 
assumed that dialoguing refers to an engagement between two different religions in 
what technically could be described as an interreligious, bi-lateral, academic, 
intentional, interpersonal, official, dialogue-of-specialists style of event, and thus 
consisting of Participant-A from Religion-A dialoguing with Participant-S from 
Religion-B as graphically represented in Figure 1. 
In its minimalist form, a dialogue is conducted between two delegates alone, 
and so it is assumed herein hereafter. Of course, other event configurations are 
possible, but such complexity is beyond the scope of this paper. One need only 
substitute the faith of their choice for Religion-A and Religion-B if a personalised 
example is needed (e.g., Christians dialoguing with Muslims). However, a variety 
of traditions will be referred to and their concerns integrated into the text herein as 
exemplars (albeit, with a strong reportage flavour) to demonstrate the viability, 
versatility and range of issues associated with the dialogue enterprise, and also the 
pan-religious nature of the problem. 
Some Potential Sources of Interreligious Discord 
Despite the intrinsic merits of the various above-mentioned dialogue schemes 
rooted in their unique faith traditions, whenever an official organiser selects one of 
them to underpin their religious event (whether consciously or unconsciously), it 
can automatically generate potential discord. For example, how many Christians 
would be willing to abandon their Christianity and follow Hindu dialogue 
practices and vice versa without a strong twinge of concern? There is scant critical 
literature documenting the reasons for religions refusing to engage in formal 
dialogue; but some possible reasons for this reluctance include the fear of 
contamination, the threat of conversion, or just an uncomfortable perception that it 
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is somehow unwholesome to engage with the religious Other, especially if 
conceived as their putative "enemy" or "competitor." 
Therefore, faiths may refuse to cooperate simply because of a perceived bias 
against their own religion/faith/ideological tradition/preferred dialogue scheme, let 
alone any substantive arguments about the content of the communication. Any 
resultant suggestions for adopting the aggrieved faith's preference (i.e., belief 
parochialism) may only generate additional concerns from the remaining Others 
(especially at multi-lateral events), all of whom might legitimately ask: "Why 
don't you use our dialogue scheme, especially since you claim respect for our 
tradition?" Should each tradition vigorously insist upon its own dialogue scheme 
before engaging the Other, the envisioned conversation may not proceed as concern 
evolves into offence then into rejection leading to abandonment of both the 
enterprise and the dissenting faith(s). 
Documenting such grievances, the limitations of each dialoguing scheme, and 
past event failures would be fascinating, as would academic excursions into the 
definition(s) of "religion," "dialogue" and their impact upon "interreligious 
communications," but this discussion is also beyond the scope of the paper. So, 
what can be done to avoid this potential rejection scenario and actively encourage 
dialoguing whilst intrinsically enhancing the potency of the process? 
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Figure 1: 
Australian Religion Studies Review 
Block Venn Diagram of Bi-Lateral Dialogue Participants and 
Possible Event Inter-relationships 
UNIVERSE 
DIALOGUE GONFE:tiENCE (A.lfDelega:tes & Visitors) 
SPECIFIC DIALOGUE SESSION 
- RELIGION-A DIALOGERS AUDIENCE 
c Active vs. Passive Members Conference & Session 
H (Officially Chosen& Insiders) Participants, the Media, 
A Spectators, Unofficial & 
I RELIGION-B DIALOGERS (Semi-)Official Dialogue 
R Active vs. Passive Members Observers 
(Officia:lly Chosen & Insiders) (Insiders & Outdoors) 
....__ 
Various Religions/Ideologies in One Specific Session 
~ .. :,.,, Vanot1s Religtdns!Ideolog1eS Atten:dl:ng the Conference 
All People 
Active = Engaged member within a team 
Passive = Unengaged member within a team 
Insider= A representative believerOutside =A person not of the engaged faith 
Officially Chosen = Faith approved member 
There are ten interactions that the Transactional Communication Model (see Figure 
2) can be applied to herein, namely: 
I. Between Religion-A and Religion-B with an Audience 
2. Between Religion-A and Religion-B without an Audience 
3. Within Religion-A's members (if a team) 
4. Within Religion-B's members (if in a team) 
5. Between Religion-A and the Audience 
6. Between Religion-Band the Audience 
7. Within the Audience (individually and as groups). 
8. Between the Chair and Religion-A 
9. Between the Chair and Religion-B 
10. Between the Chair and the Audience 
For the purposes of this brief explication, it is assumed that interaction possibility 
No. 2 is in play, and comprising of delegates from Religion-A and Religion-B 
without a Chair. Of course, this analysis can be greatly complicated if all ten 
possibilities were taken into account, communication theory-wise. 
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A Scientific Solution to Avoiding Inherent Dialogue Discord 
One strategy for avoiding the type of potential religious discord mentioned 
above is to premise the whole dialogue enterprise upon a scientific foundation 
rooted in human communication science. After all, an unavoidable common fact 
shared by all participants, regardless of their politico-religious orientation, is that 
they must verbally communicate with one another as human beings. Therefore, it 
seems eminently logical to start from this basic human reality and design a system 
that will generate desirable dialogue outcomes while simultaneously avoiding the 
type of religious discord that scheme selection bias can create. One practical 
solution to this problem is to adopt the Transactional Communication Model 
(TCM) and apply it to official interreligious events like those organised by the 
World Council of Churches (WCC). 
Not only is the TCM a transgeneric means of circumventing potential 
religious discord, but it can also enhance dialogue potency that is only obtainable 
through the power of scientific rigour. The following is a preliminary conceptual 
exploration of how human communication science can improve interreligious 
dialoguing through an intimate understanding of the TCM process. This approach 
has the potential to tum religious rhetoric into scientific discourse about faith by 
the faithful for the faithful. It is not a case of"religion" being replaced by "science" 
but rather "science" serving "religion" by side-stepping potential religious 
impediments. After all, who could seriously claim that improving communication, 
understanding and religious discourse between world faiths is not a worthwhile 
exercise, especially in the troubled times of post-September 11, 2001? 
Logically speaking, there may be some people who object to this scientific 
approach for whatever reason, and it is their right not to participate if desired. 
However, one would strongly suggest that the cause of their faith, enhanced 
interreligious relations plus world improvement will be more quickly achieved by 
taking this more objective, impartial, scientific path than by embracing the 
limitations of religious centrism. Now is a good time to try something new in this 
post-Millennia!, global communication age, and even if scientific dialogue is not 
perfect, war is worse! 
The Transactional Communication Model (TCM) and 
Interreligious Dialoguing 
The TCM belongs to the broad class of communication transmission models 
which "treats people as machines which have a coded set of information they pass 
from one to the other" (Lewis and Slade, 1994:9). This information exchange 
process was analysed and categorised by Western scholars (Taylor et a!. 1977:5) 
into what is now a classic model comprising of eight constitutive elements, 
graphically represented in Figure 2 (with additional author enhancements for ease 
of understanding). 
Of course, more advanced models, systems and communication theories exist 
(Griffm, 1991) including one engineering attempt to demonstrate God's 
communications design of the Bible (Thron, 2002), but the basic TCM was chosen 
because of its acceptability and pervasiveness within the business world; and also 
54 Australian Religion Studies Review 
to demonstrate the general viability of this approach for formal dialoguing which 
can then be extrapolated into more sophisticated models once its basic feasibility is 
established. After all, proverbially speaking, one needs to learn to crawl before one 
can run. Taylor et al. 's (1977) communication model will then be considered in 
relation to a hypothetical bi-lateral dialogue, that is, a minimal event configuration 
of Figure 1 will be linked to the TCM process described in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: The Transactional Communication Model (TCM) 
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The Classic Human Communication Model 
The eight elements of Taylor et al.'s (1977) TCM comprises of: (1) a Source, 
(2) Stimulus Received from the Source, (3) a Receiver, (4) Sensory Receptors, (5) 
the Receiver's Interpretations of and Responses to the Sensations, (6) Noise, (7) 
Feedback, and (8) a Situation or Context. The following is a brief explication of 
each of these elements and their potential ramification for dialoguing. 
1.0 A Source (Religion-A; Participant-A) 
Simply put, one needs human dialoguers meeting together to discuss issues 
before interreligious dialogue can start (at the bare minimum,· a relational dyad). 
After all: 
Dialogue occurs between individual people, not between collectivities. If 
Jews and Christians are to respect each other's traditions, they must do so 
on the basis of personal dialogue. That dialogue must begin by each 
partner taking the other seriously as an individual rather than as a 
representative of a general type (Breslauer, 1991:120-121). 
The necessity of personal communication has often been stressed within the 
critical literature. For example, it has been claimed that: "Dialogue can take place 
only between people, living people, sharing the conflicts, ambiguities, tragedies, 
and hopes of human life" (Samartha, 1981 :69). In fact, except in "the minds of 
textbook writers, there is no such thing as Buddhism or Hinduism, or Christianity 
for that matter. There are only persons who think of themselves as Buddhists, 
Hindus, or Christians" (Cox, 1989: 12). Since human communication is 
unavoidably a people-based enterprise, it should come as no surprise that 
individual delegates need to take the prime positions in this process, and with a 
genuine desire to communicate with the religious Other. As James Baesler 
(1997:9) put it: "At some level of consciousness at least one of the relational 
beings must have an intent to communicate," but for successful communication to 
occur in practice, both persons must have this desire and then act responsibly upon 
it. 
Although this Source requirement is self-evident, and at first glance 
apparently a non-issue, it can have very serious consequences for what has been 
offered as legitimate interreligious dialogue in the past, particularly concerning the 
issues of: (a) dead religions; (b) non-religionists and ex-religionists; and (c) the 
ontological status of imaginary dialogues; all of which has trapped many an 
unwary critic in the past. 
1.1 Source Implications for Dead Religions 
Claims for interreligious dialogue between Christianity and a dead religion 
like Ancient Egyptian Atenism, for example, cannot take place if there is . nobody 
to legitimately represent Atenists (as opposed to those knowledgeable about Aten 
beliefs, such as Egyptologists). The Christian delegate at such a conversation 
might be able to legitimately comment about some aspects of Aten worship, but if 
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there is no legitimate Aten follower to respond (because it is a dead religion), then 
there is no true Source. Therefore, if there is no true Source, there is no legitimate 
dialoguer, the communication becomes functionally one-sided, and thus no 
interreligious dialogue has actually occurred (as opposed to a discussion about 
Atenism by a Christian and an interested Egyptologist, and no matter how expert 
and erudite). It is an embarrassingly obvious point that can be easily overlooked 
precisely because of its obviousness. As professional dialoguer Paul Mojzes 
(1989:206) argued: "one cannot speak of the "death" of dialogue ... unless one or 
both of them [religions] should vanish as viable life styles." This is the case with 
Atenism which had historically evaporated like the proverbial drop of water in the 
desert after Pharaoh Akhenaton's death (Giles, 1970). 
Even the ontological status of dead religions, and their modem corollaries, 
arcane religions, can be problematic as Archbishop Marcello Zago (2000:6) 
observed concerning the re-emergence of modem Celts, Gauls, old African 
religions, voodoo and New Age syncretism. Who can legitimately claim to be the 
rightful heir to these ancient, changing and diverse religious traditions, which no 
doubt will form the basis of much professional soul searching and pre-dialogue 
discussion? 
1.2 Source Implications for Non-Religionists and Ex-
Religionists 
Defining the ontological status of the Source has particular importance for the 
role of non-religionists (i.e., delegates who are not members of the representing 
faith in the formal dialogue event) and for the role of ex-religionists (i.e., delegates 
who have officially left the representing faith, such as drop outs and converts to 
other religions). As James Baesler (1994:64) put it: 
A believer, in the religious context, is one who has faith in a particular 
religious belief(s), while a nonbeliever is one who does not have faith in 
the particular religious belief(s) advocated by the believer. The non-
believer is not necessarily devoid of religious belief, but may have faith 
in a religious belief(s) that differs from the believer. 
Therefore, as with dead religions, the disqualifying exclusion rule applies to 
them as well. Why? Because: 
... it is not sufficient that the dialogue partners discuss a religio-
ideological subject... Rather, they must come to the dialogue as persons 
somehow significantly identified with a religious or ideological 
community. If I were neither a Christian nor a Marxist, for example, I 
could not participate as a "partner" in a Christian-Marxist dialogue, 
though I might listen in, ask some questions of information, and make 
some helpful comments (Swidler, 1988:13). 
Indeed, as "a non-Christian, non-Muslim, it would be inappropriate for an 
outsider to intrude on that conversation born out of the particular historical and 
theological needs of those traditions" (Charry, 1988:218). The reason being that 
an: 
Volume 16, Number 1 
Interreligious dialogue is not simply a discussion between people. To be 
an interreligious dialogue, it is necessary that some of the people in some 
way represent one religious community and that others of the people in 
some way represent different religious community. Otherwise no Jews 
and/or no Christians need be present at a Jewish-Christian dialogue 
(Samuelson, 1987:239). 
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Obviously, such a scenario would be absurd, but if it did occur, then 
logically speaking, a discussion may have occurred, but it cannot be called 
legitimate interreligious dialogue (whatever else it might be and whatever good 
might come of it). 
1.3 Source Implications for Imaginary Dialogues 
The ontological status of the Source also has far-reaching implications 
concerning imaginative dialogues. Of course, acting as if there were a real dialogue 
going on can legitimately occur, but like the case of non-religionists and ex-
religionists, it cannot be called interreligious dialogue. This type of situation 
frequently happens when a devotee of one Christian religion (e.g., Seventh-day 
Adventists) tries to "explain" the beliefs of another religion (e.g., Roman 
Catholicism) before their congregation some Sunday morning; the "Catholic" in 
reality being another Adventist playing the Catholic role. Usually this role is 
performed with the conscious or unconscious intent of showing how 
wrong/bad/misguided the Catholics are, and why the Seventh-day Adventists are 
right/good/correct. It is essentially a faith confirming exercise offered as dialogue-
cum-religious education or faith instruction. For true education to occur, what is 
needed are real members of the religious Other, not sham members. In short, the 
Source criterion needs to be fully satisfied before one can legitimately move to the 
next stage in the human communication cycle, namely, message transmission. 
2.0 Stimulus Emanating from the Source: The Message 
Not only must there be a real Source, but also a real Stimulus (i.e., the 
message) emanating from that Source. The mere presence of the religion's 
representative without them contributing some overt, verifiable Stimulus to the 
discussion, even at an officially sanctioned dialogue event, is not interreligious 
dialogue. In philosophical parlance, their physical presence is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for dialogue. Why? Because dialogue, "even at its best, is only 
talk" (Buren, 1989:423). More importantly, "at the heart of interreligious dialogue 
stands true, bidirectional communication; only where humans can freely "talk" to 
each other can true dialogue occur" (Teipen, 1994:354). 
2.1 The Necessity for Message Corporeality, Strength and 
Representativeness 
A corollary of the need for a real Stimulus message is for it to be physical in 
nature and of appropriate signal strength. Not only must dialogue participants 
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verbally respond, but human language "presupposes corporeality: vocal utterances 
need to be audible" (Traber, 1990:210). Nor does it: 
... help to plead ineffability, to claim that this presumed [religious] unity 
is beyond the scope of language, for we must remember that we are 
discussing the issue of interreligious dialogue, which by its very nature 
is linguistic. To claim that the purported unity can be neither understood 
nor expressed to another by means of language is to condemn the 
dialogue to failure from the start (Lose!, 1989:192). 
Interreligious dialoguing is an earthly mundane act, not a heavenly mystical 
one. Indeed, the Stimulus message must also be relevant and representative to 
qualify as authentic dialogue. Indeed, there "is no true dialogue when each side is 
relating to a phantom of its own projection, however benevolent that projection 
might be, rather than to a view of the dialogue that the other can truly accepf' 
(Jacob, 1991:90-91). Once the message has been composed within the Source and 
transmitted, it needs to be heard by someone (i.e., one's dialogue partner). 
3.0 A Receiver (Religion-B; Participant-B) 
The Receiver accepts, decodes and interprets the Stimulus message from the 
Source (i.e., hears and understands the information). As James Baesler (1994:64) 
puts it: "Receptiveness to different religious ideas is contingent upon attending to 
and comprehending those ideas." If there is no Receiver, then, although the act of 
talking may have occurred when a message was produced and transmitted by the 
Source, interpersonal communication has not occurred, and so logically speaking, 
no interreligious dialogue could possibly have occurred. Talking at someone or 
thing or nothing (i.e., the proverbial "talking to the wind") is not communication. 
A monologue is not a dialogue. For example, a Roman Catholic dialoguer 
addressing only Roman Catholic delegates might be engaging in a nice lecture, but 
no interreligious dialogue has occurred. This is literally a case of preaching to the 
converted, even if interpersonal and intrareligious communication was successful. 
Although mono interreligious dialogue scenarios may appear unlikely in 
practice, this is what happened between Marxists and Christians at the Paulus 
Gesellschaft International's European Congress held at Salzburg: 
... the 1977 European Congress turned out to be a discussion among 
Christians of different persuasions. It could not be a dialogue since there 
were not enough Marxists present to dialogue with Christians ... Moreover, 
even the Christians failed to dialogue. With the exception of four or five 
well-prepared papers, the remaining presentations turned out to be a series 
of statements, frequently taking the form of sermons on the major sub-
themes of the Congress established for each day... (Thobaben and 
Piediscalzi, 1978 :208). 
This particular European Congress had the multiple defects of: (a) turning 
into an intrareligious dialogue (i.e., between Christians of different persuasions) 
and not an interideological dialogue as originally envisioned (i.e., between 
Christians and Marxists), (b) it did not have enough delegates to fairly represent 
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the Marxists (i.e., a multi Source/Receiver failure), and (c) even in its default 
Christian intrareligious mode, it presumably turned into an unresponsive 
monologue rather than a relevant dialogue (i.e., a two-way communication failure). 
Although one might imagine that having a Source, a Message and a Receiver are 
the minimal essential requirements for communication to successfully occur, the 
process is far more complicated than expected. 
4.0 Sensory Receptors: The Machinery of Perception 
This criterion is a refmed extension of the above-mentioned need to have a 
Source and a Receiver before interreligious dialogue can begin to occur. After all, 
"Human communication presupposes perception by and through our senses. It thus 
has an essential bodily quality" (Traber, 1990:209). So, once there is a bodily 
Receiver and a bodily Source providing Stimulus, the message must be physically 
strong enough to be perceived by the Receiver before being decoded, interpreted 
and replied to, after all, "there can be no such thing as a one-way dialogue" 
(Swidler, 1983 :3). 
One of the obvious practical consequences of this human communication 
requirement is that dialoguers have no major sensory deficiencies (e.g., deafness). 
If delegates do have sensory deficiencies, then at the very least they must have 
support to compensate for this limitation (e.g., hearing aides). One needs only to 
imagine the potentially disastrous political ramifications if a faith claimed a desire 
to hear the Other, and then sent physically deaf delegates unaided to hear them! 
This could be interpreted as a major snub (physical, religious, political and 
symbolic speaking). 
5.0 The Receiver's Interpretations and Responses to the 
Stimulus: Information Processing Requirements 
Once the Stimulus message from the Source has been physically detected by 
the Receiver via their sensory apparatus (appropriately augmented as needed), it 
then has to be decoded, interpreted and responded too. During this process, 
delegates must understand each other and take full responsibility for it. The reason 
being that: 
... communication is shared responsibility between participants. Each 
person is responsible for competent communication. Participants are not 
[just isolated] senders or listeners; all participants are co-creators of 
successful communication. No one participant has more or less 
responsibility than others in the situation for the successful creation of 
meaning. The goal of communication is, therefore, to create mutual 
understanding (Yoder, Hugenberg and Wallace, 1993: 15). 
And as Chris Thron (2002: 11) pointed out: "the more accurate the 
transmission, the longer the decoding process." However, this human 
communication requirement is subject to two significant sources of interference, 
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namely: (a) language misunderstandings, and (b) conceptual misunderstandings; 
both of which can have devastating consequences if not controlled adequately. 
5.1 Language Misunderstandings 
This sort of misunderstanding can easily result from the lack of a common 
language used during the dialogue. For example, the Stimulus message may have 
been generated by a Christian (i.e., the Source) in English, and it was heard by a 
Buddhist (i.e., the Receiver), but it was not understood because the Buddhist 
delegate only understands Tibetan. In which case, it is neither dialogue nor 
communication, even if linguistic data was sent back and forth between them. 
Adopting a common language or using a translator service can resolve this practical 
difficulty, although it can also generate its own pragmatic problems. These 
potential difficulties can range from the political battles involved in selecting the 
official language of the dialogue (e.g., English, French, German, Latin?) to the 
fmancial costs involved with providing multiple translators, especially by poorer 
delegates. 
5.2 Conceptual Misunderstandings 
Misunderstanding at the level of concepts can be very complex and difficult 
to deal with. For example, it may be virtually impossible for a Buddhist to truly 
understand a Christian, and vice versa, even if the message was spoken in a 
language understood by both sides (e.g., English) because of prima facie 
incompatible conceptual frameworks. For example, Peggy Morgan (1995:161) once 
attributed low attendance at a dialogue conference to this sort of mismatched 
conceptual framework. She claimed: "It may be that Buddhists are tired of an 
interfaith language which asserts that we are all children of the one God and which 
is inappropriate for their tradition. This was raised strongly by some Buddhist 
participants at Chicago 1993." 
This sort of incompatibility issue was also raised by Norman Solomon 
(1991: 17) concerning Jewish-Christian relations. He argued that: "It may not, for 
instance, be possible to talk within the language of Christianity about distinctively 
Jewish concepts such as those of Torah and mitzva, or to talk within the language 
of Judaism about Christ or incarnation." Indeed, similar conceptual confusions can 
also exist because of different factions within a religious tradition. For example: 
... within the Jewish world, there is widespread confusion about the 
meaning of the religious terms of the past. The various sub-groups of 
Jewry - Hasidim, Orthodox Jews, Reform Jews, Conservative Jews, 
Reconstructionist Jews, Polydox Jews, Humanistic Jews, as well as Jewish 
secularists - utilize -the same words while giving them utterly different 
interpretations (Cohn-Sherbock, 1994: 179). 
Unless these is an appreciation of what these different concepts are, or at least 
how they compare with each other in reference to some common defmition of 
reality, then it can be argued that no true, authentic communication can occur, 
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dialogue related or otherwise. Indeed, without "commonly intelligible contents, 
one wonders what coreligionists dialogue is about. And how?" (Yadav, 1988: 180). 
5.3 Going Beyond the Sharing of "Raw" Beliefs: A Dialogue 
Enterprise Imperative 
Pragmatically speaking, dialoguers will need to go beyond the sharing of 
their "raw" beliefs to the creation of some standardised mode of presentation that 
accommodates all the variables within their differing belief systems. This applies 
equally well within religious traditions as between them, due to context, bias and 
favoured interpretations that may impede understanding. Indeed, for a "theology to 
be meaningful, it must never be so closed into one symbol system that it cannot 
be understood by anyone else" (Horsfjord, 2001:54). As Peggy Morgan (1995:163) 
suggested, one would need to analyse "how the language worlds fit together and 
whether there is consistency or any reflection on the part of the believer about what 
is taking place and why." 
At the same time, it must also allow intelligible comparisons and common 
understandings to be achieved in a fair and equitable manner. This requirement was 
prefigured by Raimundo Panikkar (1987:103) when he claimed that: 
A fruitful dialogue has to agree on the parameters to be used in the 
dialogue itself, otherwise there i-s only talking at cross-purposes. Simply 
stated: What do we mean by the very words we use? The talk about 
meaning of words precedes, conditions, and also constitutes dialogue. 
Boys, Lee and Bass (1995:262) also advised that: "in the early stages, we 
need to provide participants with a vocabulary and conceptual framework adequate 
for dialogue." As did Monica Konrad Hellwig (1982:72) who argued that dialogue 
"assumes the meaning of some common terms and understandings and the need to 
explain some unique terms." Unfortunately, no practical solutions were offered by 
these commentators, yet, there is a practical way around this dilemma. 
5.4 What Can Be Done to Promote Dialogue Understanding? 
If one does not want, for example, to use a Christian's exclusive use of a 
Buddhist's religious system as the only means to access its core-experience (i.e., 
enter into what Pieris (1987:163) called a cominunicatio in sacris); or if one does 
not want to violate one's own belief stance, as Peggy Morgan (1995:161) had 
reported regarding: "a bhikkhu [who] was prepared to relate to the predominant [but 
inappropriate] God-language of his audience in order to communicate Buddhist 
concerns"; and if one still wants to engage the religious Other with integrity and 
co-operation, then one practical solution is to adopt Leonard Swidler's (1990:55-
56) ecumenical Esperanto, that is, "a way of understanding ancient religious 
insights in terms of critical thought... building a "universal theology of religion-
ideology."" 
This was a good first step, however, a better practical solution that still fits 
within the ecumenical esperanto tradition and has significant heuristic benefits is to 
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use a taxonomic/typological approach. This allows one to go beyond what Paul 
Knitter (1987:185) called shared "shaky ground," while avoiding the trap of 
superficial, common denominator reductionism. Such a conceptual schema is an 
important aide in helping the Receiver's interpretations and responses to the 
Stimulus. 
5.5 The Taxonomic/Typological Approach to Religious 
Phenomena 
This general strategy has been advocated for some time within the broad 
religious community. For example, Smart and Hecht (1982) examined different 
religious systems and dissected their components into six distinctive categories, 
namely: (a) Sacred Narrative, (b) Doctrine, (c) Ritual, (d) Institutional Expression, 
(e) Experience, and (f) Ethics. So, whatever the differences in factual content 
between the differing religions, the broad areas of phenomenal type had been 
identified, delineated, defmed, categorised, compared, and hopefully understood 
and appreciated by all. This taxonomical approach was further enhanced by Moore 
and Habel (1982) with their typology of religion for the classroom. They proffered 
eight distinctive categories of religious phenomena, namely: (a) Beliefs, (b) 
Religious Experience, (c) Sacred Stories, (d) Texts, (e) Ritual, (f) Social Structure, 
(g) Religious Ethics, and (h) Sacred Symbols; all of with contained many fmely 
detailed subdivisions within each category and subcategory (see their Appendix 1). 
5.5.1 Six Advantages_ of the Classificatory Approach 
There are at least six heuristic advantages to be gained from this classificatory 
approach, and which significantly impacts upon the dialogic enterprise as a whole. 
Namely: 
(a) 
(b) 
It consciously and unconsciously, explicitly and implicitly, breaks 
down barriers between faiths by demonstrating the commonality of 
their various religious components. For example, faiths have many 
sacred stories that they like to recount to believers and non-believers 
alike (see Joseph Campbell's numerous works on world myths). In 
fact, demonstrating commonality among various religious traditions 
is one of dialogue's overt goals as espoused by Paul Mojzes 
(1978:11) in his 101h dialogue ground rule, namely: "Emphasize 
things you have in common." 
Each faith automatically gets a religious lesson in the Other's belief 
system every time a particular phenomenon is analysed and 
compared. For example, the Christian's use of The Lord's Prayer 
and the New Ager's practice of enclosing oneself within a white light 
bubble, dome, shell, circle or sphere (Buckland, 1993:60-62; 
Douglas, 1989:5; Mariechild, 1988:4-7) are both rituals of 
protection. Indeed, gaining meaningful knowledge about the Other's 
religious tradition is another desirable goal of interreligious 
dialogue. This positive outcome was also in accordance with Paul 
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Mojzes' (1978:11-12) 11 1h and 22"d dialogue ground rules. Namely: 
"Strive for a clearer understanding of his or her position. Be willing 
continually to revise your understanding of the other's views." 
"Dialogue should present a new appreciation for the value of both 
positions." Even more insights can be gleaned through iterations of 
conceptual extrapolation and interpolation. 
(c) Increased analytical power is given to the user that will elevate their 
analysis of the phenomena under consideration beyond dogmatic 
religious assertions into more objective scientific realms. Thus short-
circuiting potential dialogue barriers by resorting to rationality (with 
its rules understandable by all), instead of battling blind 
emotionalism or curt authoritarianism that stifles discussion and 
debate. 
(d) Rationality's attendant concepts are fairness and predictability, which 
all delegates can take comfort from. This can encourage further 
"safer" dialogue, whether in the pursuit of curiosity, interest or truth. 
Encouraging further dialogUe is itself an intrinsically desirable goal, 
while this more rigorous mode of examining faith phenomena 
becomes an act of interreligiosity in, and of, itself. One can thus 
walk their talk and then talk about their walk. 
(e) The taxonomical/typological approach locates specific religious 
phenomena within the universe of all religious phenomena, and thus 
places definable parameters upon phenomena that are traditionally 
relegated to the infinite or the ineffable. Once the infinite becomes 
finite and effable, it can be concretised, categorised and profitably 
employed for a variety of pro-dialogue purposes. If increased 
theological understanding is derived from this analytical process, 
then so much the better. 
(f) Interreligious dialogue can now be rescued from the tyranny of the 
simplistic. For example, when someone asked Tenzin Gyatso, the 
14th Dalai Lama of Tibet about his faith. he replied: "My religion is 
kindness" (Morgan, 1995:164). Although this was food for 
contemplative thought, and a potential poster slogan, it was 
cryptically unhelpful in the dialogic context without further 
elaboration.However, once this simple statement was located within 
the above-advocated taxonomy, one can begin to understand its 
ramifications if designated a "ritual" comment, or a "sacred story," or 
part of the Buddhist "ethical system." Concept guessing is now 
replaced with greater degrees of certitude over meaning. 
Overall, the taxonomical/typological approach is a far more efficient method 
of sharing meaningful information, and a more productive means of fostering 
understanding between different religions. 
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6.0 Noise: The Problem of Communication Interference 
Noise is a dialogic pollutant that interferes with communication pathways 
and needs to be studiously avoided. This problem can manifest itself into two 
basic forms, namely: (a) external/channel noise, or (b) internal/semantic noise. 
6.1 External/Channel Noise 
Blake and Haroldsen (1975:12) coined the term "channel noise" to describe 
those physical factors which impinge upon the communication process. For 
example, the "screeching of passing cars, the hum of an air conditioner, the lisp of 
the speaker, the sunglasses a person wears, may all be regarded as noise, since they 
interfere with the effective and efficient transmission of messages from sender to 
receiver" (DeVito, 1985: 11). Consequently, formal dialoguing needs to take place 
in relatively peaceful, quite spots, and hopefully with administrative noise 
reduction protocols put in place to ensure it. This sort of noise problem is fairly 
easy to control in the majority of instances; not so internal/semantic noise. 
6.2 Internal/Semantic Noise 
Blake and Haroldsen (1975:12) coined the term "semantic noise" to refer to 
distortions resulting from the internal world of the participants. As they explained: 
"Within any type of communication activity there often is a discrepancy between 
the codes used by the encoder and the decoder, even though the message is received 
exactly as it was sent." 
6.2.1 Seven Sources of Internal/Semantic Noise 
Internal/semantic noise can occur if the dialoguer's comments were not 
understood due to any one the following seven reasons (or combinations thereof): 
(a) The Receiver was inattentive to the Source and their Stimulus 
message and so missed it, whether due to sleepiness, daydreaming, 
fatigue etc. 
(b) The Receiver was highly charged emotionally, and thus not very 
receptive to rational discourse, especially if offended in some deep, 
personal way. Indeed, "Closed-mindedness is perhaps the classic 
example of psychological noise" (DeVito, 1985:11). 
(c) There are distorting attitudes, cultural differences and religious 
ethnocentrism that results in selective filtering of the Stimulus 
message. As was once curtly said, no "one can bring a totally open 
mind to a dialogue except an imbecile who has not yet learned to use 
a human language" (Newbigin, 1982: 14). 
(d) Using words, subject areas, sentence patterns and sets, or message 
organisational patterns that are difficult or confusing for the Receiver 
to grasp. For example, "for persons not educated in this tradition 
[Christianity], who do not understand hypostasis, physis, 
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homoousios, homoiousios, homoousios kata panta, this language 
can be not just mysterious but meaningless" (Kung, I988:205). 
(e) The use of different denotative word meanings, that is, the Receiver 
thinks the Stimulus message points to something other than 
intended by the Source. For example, the Receiver may think that 
the word "dialogue" refers to spiritual dialogue (e.g., sharing "cave 
of the heart" meditations between Zen Buddhist and Christian 
Benedictine monks), whereas the Source was actually referring to 
discourse dialogue (i.e., sharing academic ideas on specific issues). 
As Keith Williamson (1980: I2) argued concerning the concept of 
"spirituality" within Christianity: "Benedictine spirituality is 
different than Franciscan spirituality, which is different from 
Methodist spirituality." In short, the same word can have radically 
different meanings per person between and within religions. 
(f) The use of different connotative word-meanings, that is, the shades 
of meaning the Source and Receiver associate with the words used. 
Therefore, as "dialogue begins... we shall frequently find that the 
same word carries an entirely different cluster of meanings in the 
different traditions; we may also discover with surprise that quite 
different words are used to mean the same thing" (Taylor, I980:2I8). 
For example, within Christianity, the word "God" may refer to the 
OT "Yahweh," whereas other Christians may be referring to the NT 
"Lord" or "Jesus Christ," whether as "God" (i.e., the creator of the 
universe and man on Earth), or as the "Son of God" (i.e., God's 
messenger/agent/helper). As James Baesler (I997: II) noted regarding 
praying: "Christians that relate to God as Holy Spirit might pray 
differently than those that relate to God as Jesus." Alternatively, 
when Christians hear the Muslim's "Allah" they may not realise that 
this refers to God as the creator of the universe and man (including 
Christians), not some foreign, competing deity (that is usually 
perceived as a false god, a lesser god, but not our God, the real, true 
God). 
(g) Assigning different weightings to the same words. For example, as 
Norman Solomon (I99I:I6) pointed out: 
"Messiah" (in Greek, Christos), for instance, is a very weighty term for 
Christians - indeed, it may not be possible to have a Christian language 
without it. Among Jews the term carries less weight; it is important rather 
than central (an arm or leg, rather than the heart, of the body of Judaism). 
Internal/semantic noise generated within an interreligious dialogue event is 
more difficult to control than with physically based externaVchannel noise, but 
various potential control measures exist. For example, they could include the 
provision of stimulants such as tea and coffee for mental alertness, for those whom 
this is not a religious offence (Mormon delegates may need other stimulants such 
as chocolate); the provision of information sheets to alert delegates to the potential 
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barriers a priori (i.e., adopting a forewarned is foreanned policy); and also, the 
official fostering of non-condemning attitudes as a dialogue protocol (i.e., evoking 
civility and the dialogic equivalent ofthe rule of law). It also makes good dialogue 
sense when each "partner must listen to the other as openly and sympathetically as 
he or she can in an attempt to understand the other's position as precisely and, as it 
were, from within, as possible" (Swidler, 1982:9). In essence, this tactic is aimed 
at promoting dialogic empathy. 
Because this religious attitudinal requirement has now been recast as a TCM 
requirement, it gains credibility (and increased participant compliance) by 
appealing to scientific authority (with its greater intrinsic appeal to impartiality). 
This can help alleviate many potential fears of religious contamination, or concern 
over surreptitious conversion intents by those delegates who think it a form of 
devious trickery to be "forced" to think like the religious Other. 
7.0 Feedback: Response Actualisation 
Feedback is a critical communication element that links the Source with the 
Receiver and is frequently seen as the defining characteristic of two-way 
communication. Keith Williamson (1980: 12) described the overall process as: 
"interpersonal communication - i.e., conversations between "you" and "me"" as 
distinct from: "Intrapersonal communication [which] is basically a conversation 
that "I" have with "myself."" Without Feedback, one cannot check if the Source's 
Stimulus message has been correctly understood by the Receiver. After all, to "talk 
about people is not the same as to talk to them; nor is this quite the same as to 
talk with them" (Smith, 1973:4 7). Not only does one-way communication violate 
the important dialogic criteria of mutual respect and reciprocity, but "under the 
monological model faith becomes blind credulity, for questions cannot be asked, 
and unless we are able to question, how can we check whether we have got it right 
or not?" (Potter, 1988:3). It was a valid point. 
As Don Jackson (1991:40) argued regarding the communication cycle in the 
preaching context: "With feedback the preacher receives some evidence of the 
reception of the sermon and may make adjustments as necessary," for example, 
changing one's speech volume to compensate for a noisy room. Feedback also 
"allows the preacher to evaluate the impact of the message and various factors 
which affect that impact (simplicity, Biblical basis, relevance, and source 
credibility)" (Jackson, 1991 :41 ). Dialogue delegates do the same sorts of things 
while trying to get their points across. 
Officially organised, bi-lateral interreligious dialoguing requires the 
representative of Religion-A (i.e., the Source) to talk (i.e., produce Stimulus) to 
the representative of Religion-B (i.e., the Receiver) who is physically present, 
attentive, has perceived all the message, understood it, and responded competently, 
appropriately, and reciprocally. This Feedback requirement is the human 
communication equivalent of Paul Mojzes' (1978: 11) 11th dialogue ground rule. 
Namely: "Listen to what your partner is saying. Strive for a clearer understanding 
of his or her position. Be willing to revise your understanding of the other's 
viewpoint." Dialogue is not a monologue cut in two! 
Volume 16, Number 1 67 
If we apply this element of the TCM to dialoguing, then it means 
understanding the Stimulus message properly via repeated cycles of the Feedback 
process (with one cycle being the theoretical minimum). Then based upon that 
correctly received message, we can learn from it (i.e., change our past perceptions 
based upon more correct facts). When this learning happens we have automatically 
changed as a result of this newly found knowledge (i.e., personal and intellectual 
growth). Feedback is thus the pivotal moment of intellectual advancement, in 
addition to being the defming characteristic of two-way communication-cum-
interreligious dialoguing. 
8.0 A Situation or Context: The Interpretative Milieu 
This last remaining TCM elements refers to "the situation or setting within 
which communication takes place or the circumstances that surround a particular 
piece of communication" (Dwyer, 1993:12). And especially considering the non-
existence of a social vacuum, and that "hardly any "context" today is isolated, there 
will always be other "contexts" with which one is in contact" (Horsfjord, 2001 :54). 
So, when "trying to interpret other's messages, we need to understand that the 
context affects how we perceive the relationship, and that the relationship 
influences the meaning we give to the content" (Yoder, Hugenberg and Wallace, 
1993:17). 
This milieu factor is important for interreligious dialoguing for it can impact 
upon: (a) the reason for the dialogue, (b) the specific intent of communicating, (c) 
the place and location of the communicating, (d) the actual occasion of 
communicating, (e) the nature of the dialogue participants, (f) their relationships 
with each other, and (g) their relationship across the faith lines. These variables 
(and interrelationships) can colour all the Stimulus messages before, during and 
after the dialogue. After all, "communication is different in a discussion among 
close friends at a favorite watering hole,. at a funeral home where a memorial 
service is being held for a loved one, or at a rowdy New Year's Eve party in a 
friend's home" (DeFleur, Kearney and Plax, 1993:23). Dialoguing is no different. 
Indeed, a dialogue about the religious response to abortion, for example, 
takes on a whole new dimension if it occurs inside an abortion clinic, or a brothel, 
than it would if it was held in a church or university lecture theatre. As such, and 
if the potential dialoguers felt strongly enough about it, it can determine if the 
delegates will participate in the event at all. Not surprisingly, the context can also 
affect "the emotions people feel about each other, their relative power and status, 
their attraction for each other, and their involvement with each other's lives" 
(Yoder, Hugenberg and Wallace, 1993: 16). Given the close proximity of dialogue 
participants, the discussing of strongly felt religious-cum-emotional issues before 
"rivals" and peers, and the potential for year long (and greater) dialogue programs, 
ensuring right relations between each other is essential for continued successful 
engagement (Kozlovic, 2001 b). 
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A Human Communication Specification for Interreligious 
Dialoguing: Going Beyond Traditional Religious Formulations 
If we consider all of the above criteria derived from the TCM and reformulate 
it, then interreligious dialogue can be said to contain thirteen basic elements. 
Namely, it is: (a) an active, dynamic event; (b) a pragmatically orientated event; (c) 
a two-way process of primarily verbal communication supported by non-verbal 
behaviour; (d) dedicated to exchanging deeply held views; (e) on common subjects; 
(f) between two or more fundamentally different participants; (g) who hold many 
differing views; (h) and who officially represent their faith/religion/ideology; (i) 
using a common mode of information presentation; G) for the explicit purpose of 
learning from each other and/or elucidating various religious viewpoints; (k) with 
the specific intent of achieving mutual understanding, respect and cooperation; (l) 
while the process is being conducted in a fair, just and sympathetic manner; and 
(m) freely accepting whatever results emerge from the activity (but hopefully it is a 
positive and constructive engagement). 
This enhanced human communication scientific formulation significantly 
expands upon older definitions of interpersonal communication. Such as: 
... an interactive process whereby two individuals in the context of a 
personal relationship (some level of personal knowledge and intimacy is 
necessary) and particular situation, create, transmit, receive, and 
coordinate their symbolic verbal and nonverbal messages with the intent 
to share meaning with one another (Baesler, 1997:9). 
More importantly, this newly enhanced TCM defmition significantly expands 
upon the numerous religiously based definitions of interreligious dialogue. For 
example: "By dialogue is meant a conversation on a common subject between two 
or more persons with differing views. The primary goal of dialogue is for each 
participant to learn from the other. Stated negatively, dialogue is not debate" 
(Swidler, 1982:9). Alternatively, "First and foremost, dialogue is an encounter of 
religious persons on the level of their understanding of their deepest commitments 
and ultimate concerns" (Swearer, 1977:3 5). Or, "interreligious dialogue requires 
four criteria: (1) interpersonal communication; (2) different religious commitments; 
(3) a mutual attitude of respect and open-mindedness, implying a willingness to 
learn and grow from the other; and (4) significant religious content in, or implied 
by, the conversation" (Dunbar, 1998:456). 
Applying the TCM to Dialoguing: The General Principle 
More efficient and effective dialogue conferences can now be designed by 
addressing all the requirements of the TCM which may have been missed when 
only faith based formulations of interreligious discourse were used. For example, 
in the past, organisers may have forgotten to vet conference delegates to ensure that 
they truly represented the religion in question (i.e., a valid Source), or they did not 
arrange event sites that were quiet (i.e., avoiding physical Noise issues), or they 
did not provide appropriate beverages to aide mental concentration (i.e., avoiding 
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internal Noise issues such as inattention). They may have also forgotten to 
formally select a common dialogue language (i.e., avoiding cultural 
misunderstandings), or they had inappropriately labelled monologue events as 
dialogue events when the communication flow was only one-way (i.e., no valid 
Receiver or Feedback). These sorts of problems can now be a thing of the past. If 
each significant variable mentioned within the TCM is acknowledged, checklist 
style, and then applied to the planning of every future interreligious event, then 
quality must inevitably improve. The superiority of the TCM framework for 
formal dialoguing will be automatically reflected in the more professional running 
of the event, and hopefully from the greater communication fruits that will 
inevitable flow from that act of professionalism. 
Conclusion 
The more scientific human communication conceptualisation of interreligious 
dialoguing yielded many profound theoretical and praxis insights that may have 
been missed by partisan religious formulations of the task. This paper has shown 
what an ideal dialogue environment would/should/could. be like, and it had 
successfully collated in one convenient spot dialogue comments culled from a wide 
literature base that supported the overarching TCM approach. No doubt, more 
technically sophisticated communication models could enhance understanding of 
these basic processes and provide even deeper insights, but at least the classical 
simplicity of Taylor et a!.' s ( 1977) · eight-element model demonstrated its 
fundamental viability in the simple one-on-one bi-lateral context. Hopefully, more 
accomplished communication scholars and religion experts will take up the 
challenge of applying their cutting edge scholarship to the turbulent world of 
interfaith communications. In the meantime, teaching the TCM to neophyte 
researchers seems a useful first step. Further exploratory research into this exciting 
interdisciplinary field is warranted, recommended and certainly long overdue. 
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